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Can board environmental orientation improve US firms’ carbon 
performance? The mediating role of carbon strategy 
 
Abstract 
Overwhelming evidence from prior research suggests a positive association between corporate 
board characteristics and carbon performance; however, very little is known about the 
mechanisms linking the two variables. This study attempts to fill this gap by developing and 
empirically testing a conceptual model that highlights the role of carbon strategy in the 
relationship between board environmental orientation (BEO) and carbon performance. We 
argue that BEO can directly and indirectly influence carbon performance through carbon 
strategy. Using structural equation modelling to analyse data consisting of 2,301 US firm-year 
observations over the 2005-2015 period, we find that the greater the BEO is, the better its 
carbon performance (i.e., lower greenhouse gas emissions). The results also provide evidence 
of the mediating effect of carbon strategy on the relationship between BEO and carbon 
performance. Splitting the sample into high and low carbon-intensive industries shows a partial 
mediation effect in high carbon-intensive industries and a full mediation effect in low carbon-
intensive industries. The findings of the study and its implications for scholars, policy makers, 
managers, investors and environmentalists are discussed. 
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Over the last decade, firms have witnessed increased public scrutiny of their environmental 
performance in the pursuit of proactive environmental initiatives and green investments. As 
carbon performance and disclosure are integral parts of firms’ environmental accountability, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions information is becoming critical in making long-term 
investments (Vesty, Telgenkamp, & Roscoe, 2015). Sell-side analysts are ‘primarily 
interested’ in GHG emissions and their impact on firms’ value (Eccles, Serafeim, & Krzus, 
2011). Moreover, information about GHG emissions is becoming an essential component of 
assessing firms’ risk profiles, and there is evidence of decreased firm value with increased 
GHG emissions (Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-Muñoz, 2014). 
The carbon performance of firms has also gained substantial attention due to the pressures 
exerted on firms by several statutes/initiatives, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, to address environmental crises. It is reported that high carbon 
emissions firms can be subject to a penalty of 6.57% of their market capitalisation; however, 
despite its significance, it is argued that carbon performance and risks may not be fully 
understood by practitioners (Chapple, Clarkson, & Gold, 2013). Moreover, it is claimed that 
firms focus more on process-oriented environmental performance (Delmas, Etzion, & Nairn-
Birch, 2013) and carbon reduction initiatives (Haque, 2017; Haque & Ntim, 2018) rather than 
actual environmental/carbon performance, which is probably due to the ease and speed 
associated with communicating these disclosures to stakeholders to improve the corporate 
image as a responsible business. Thus, more research is needed to improve our understanding 
of the carbon performance of a firm, such as its underpinnings and determinants, including the 
role of corporate boards and their environmental orientation in reducing carbon emissions and 
other pollution. 
The role of corporate boards in environmental performance has become a focal point as a result 
of the renewed interest in corporate governance after a number of corporate scandals around 
the turn of the century. Firms can avoid multi-billion dollar losses that can be associated with 
environmental disasters, such as the BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 
(approximately $40 billion). It is claimed that the BP oil spill could have been prevented or at 
least have its consequences minimised if the board had rigorously fulfilled its duties (de 
Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011). 
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Hence, an increasing body of literature has recently focused on environmental management in 
an attempt to understand the determinants of environmental performance (Abdel-Maksoud, 
Kamel, & Elbanna, 2016; Post, Rahman, & McQuillen, 2015). Although the influence of board 
characteristics on the wider area of environmental performance has been examined in many of 
these studies (e.g., de Villiers et al., 2011; Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 2017; Ortiz-
de-Mandojana & Aragón-Correa, 2015; Shaukat, Qiu, & Trojanowski, 2016), very few have 
addressed the impact on the more specific area of carbon performance (Haque, 2017), which 
this study aims to contribute to. 
Our knowledge of the impact of firms’ carbon strategy on their actual carbon performance is 
also limited (Matsumura et al., 2014; Yunus, Elijido-Ten, & Abhayawansa, 2016). Moreover, 
it is believed that “the mechanisms linking board composition to corporate environmental 
performance, including carbon performance, are not well understood” (Post et al., 2015, p. 
423). Although Haque (2017) examined the direct impact of board characteristics on carbon 
performance, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined the mechanisms through 
which board characteristics influence actual carbon performance. Accordingly, this is another 
gap that our study attempts to fill by investigating the mediating role of carbon strategy in the 
relationship between firms’ board characteristics related to environmental orientation 
(hereafter, board environmental orientation (BEO)) and carbon performance. In addition, we 
investigate the role of carbon strategy based on emissions level, i.e., high versus low carbon-
intensive industries. 
The study makes a number of contributions to the literature on the relationship between BEO 
and environmental performance. Our results provide further evidence for policy makers on the 
link between the environmental orientation of boards and carbon performance. Previous 
research has focused on the direct link between board characteristics and either environmental 
performance (e.g., de Villiers et al., 2011; Glass, Cook, & Ingersoll, 2016) or environmental 
strategy (e.g., Haque, 2017; Shaukat et al., 2016) and the direct link between environmental 
strategy and environmental performance (e.g., Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011b; Czerny 
& Letmathe, 2017; Solovida & Latan, 2017). Our study is the first to examine the role of carbon 
strategy as a mediating factor on both conceptual and empirical levels. In addition, this study 
provides the first empirical evidence of the direct link between carbon strategy and carbon 
performance and provides further support for agency, resource dependence, and legitimacy 
theories. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the research 
background leading to the hypothesis development before discussing the research design in 
Section 3. Our empirical results are presented in Section 4, followed by their discussion and 
implications in Section 5. The final section presents the conclusion, limitations, and directions 
for future research. 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In response to community pressures and government regulations, firms are encouraged to adopt 
strategies that lead to enhanced environmental performance and to achieve environmental 
legitimacy (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009, Galbreath, 2010). Dealing with GHG emissions 
has become an integral part of firms’ environmental strategy. Firms endeavour to stay off 
“environmental blacklists” publicised by environmental groups (Matsumura et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, firms are taking further actions to minimise their carbon footprints, such as 
adopting new technologies, buying carbon credits, and guiding their suppliers to reduce 
emissions (Galbreath, 2017). Hence, several studies examined different governance 
mechanisms, including board characteristics, to develop our understanding of the determinants 
of environmental performance (Shaukat et al., 2016). In their quest to understand the link 
between board orientation towards environmental issues and environmental performance, 
scholars utilised several theories, including agency, resource dependence, and legitimacy 
theories. The main ‘general’ thesis of each of these theories is discussed below, leading to the 
hypothesis development. 
According to agency theory, there is a conflict of interest between management’s short-term 
interests and shareholders’ long-term interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This conflict results in agency costs that can be minimised by having an effective board 
of directors that can monitor the management (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Westphal, 1999). Effective monitoring can be achieved through enquiries about 
the rationale behind management’s strategic directions (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). It is 
argued that board structure is a determinant of its effectiveness in monitoring management and 
reducing agency costs (de Villiers et al., 2011). For example, in line with the predictions of 
agency theory, Hillman & Dalziel (2003) find a positive association between a board’s 
effectiveness in monitoring management and independent directors on the board. 
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Several studies draw on legitimacy theory (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Cho & Patten, 
2007; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015). The 
theory proposes that firms place significant emphasise on their social and environmental 
responsibilities towards different stakeholders to establish and improve their legitimacy (Cho 
& Patten, 2007; Mallin & Michelon, 2011). In addition to adhering to government regulations, 
firms seek to gain and maintain legitimacy by showcasing their good environmental 
performance (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). According to Bansal & Clelland (2004), 
environmental legitimacy could be linked to lower unsystematic risk for a few reasons: meeting 
institutional expectations (Suchman, 1995), better access to resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and less exposure to scrutiny (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Moreover, organisational 
legitimacy helps firms avoid negative consequences such as product boycotts (Elsbach, 1994) 
and enhance their reputations (de Quevedo-Puente, de la Fuente-Sabaté, & Delgado-García, 
2007). 
Under resource dependence theory, board composition is a critical determinant of firms’ 
performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Directors play an essential role in firms using their 
expertise to provide advice, network with external parties, and access external resources 
(Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wang & Dewhirst, 1992). As a resource, 
directors play different roles and can accordingly be classified according to the role they play: 
‘business experts,’ ‘support specialists,’ and ‘community influencers’ (Hillman et al., 2000). 
This classification suggests the suitability of specific directors to different environmental 
settings and has been supported in a number of studies (e.g., Jones, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2008; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Accordingly, it is suggested that board composition should 
change as the environment within which the firms operate changes (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; 
Peng, 2004). 
Our rationale for adopting a multi-theoretical framework emanates from the lack of a 
comprehensive theory that encompasses all the aspects under investigation in our study. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no single theory that can be utilised to explain the relationships 
among the main variables examined in this research. We argue that the three theories can be 
conceptually integrated through their focus on the board of directors’ functions. Hillman & 
Dalziel (2003) classify the functions of the board of directors into monitoring management and 
the provision of resources. The monitoring function is linked to agency theory, whereas the 
provision of resources is linked to resource dependence and legitimacy theories. Accordingly, 
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using a multi-theoretical framework in our study provides a better understanding of the role of 
boards of directors in improving a firm’s carbon performance. 
2.1. Board environmental orientation and carbon strategy 
A firm’s carbon strategy is an array of activities intended to manage GHG emissions levels 
(Weinhofer & Hoffmann, 2010). The link between BEO and carbon strategy, from an agency 
theory perspective, can be explained by highlighting the agency costs usually associated with 
the adoption of carbon strategies. Evidence from previous research indicates that the costs 
associated with the adoption of environmental strategies are usually significant, as these 
strategies may usually lead to changes in product design and/or the adoption of new 
manufacturing technologies (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Hence, it takes a long time for 
the benefits of strong environmental performance to be realised (Aragón-Correa, 1998; 
Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Under agency theory, the significance of the required 
investments and long-term potential of any rewards can be in conflict with the short-term 
interests of managers. Although there is evidence that management may postpone spending on 
research and development projects if the return is not attainable in the short term (Lewellen, 
Loderer, & Martin, 1987), the environmental orientation of the board is expected to be a major 
factor in whether the board will establish and operationalise a proactive environmental 
(including carbon) strategy regardless of the potentially significant costs. 
Monitoring a firm’s environmental strategy (including carbon strategy) is the responsibility of 
its board of directors (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002). Effective monitoring by the board can lead to 
minimising agency costs (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Evidence from prior research suggests 
that BEO is linked to board composition, with potential implications for a firm’s environmental 
strategy. For example, some of the board characteristics examined in prior research include 
board independence (Shaukat et al., 2016), sustainability-based compensation policy, multiple 
directorships (Haque, 2017) and gender diversity (Glass et al. 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016). 
Board independence is positively associated with a board’s vigilance level and its monitoring 
effectiveness, as implied by agency theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Johnson & Greening 
(1999) advocate that, compared to executive members, non-executive members consider the 
long-term interests of stakeholders. Previous research suggests the existence of a strong 
association between firms’ strategic choices and board vigilance (Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
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Moesel, 1994; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). In other words, higher board independence leads 
to higher board vigilance, which influences firms’ strategic choices. 
Glass et al. (2016) report a positive link between gender diversity and firms’ persuasion of an 
environmentally friendly strategy. Furthermore, based on the predictions of agency and 
resource dependence theories, Haque (2017) concludes that board independence and gender 
diversity have an impact on management’s increased focus on carbon reduction initiatives. 
An important corporate governance issue is the sustainability incentives scheme. Agency 
theory suggests that incentive-based mechanisms can motivate managers to work hard and can 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, which can minimise agency problems and 
improve performance (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haque, 2017). In this context, firms can 
use environment-related compensation schemes to motivate management to address 
environmental concerns such as GHG emissions (Campbell, Johnston, Sefcik, & Soderstrom, 
2007; Ji, 2015). For instance, Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009) find that CEO pay is positively 
related to pollution prevention strategies among US firms in polluting industries. In the same 
vein, Haque (2017) finds a positive association between sustainability-oriented incentive 
policy and carbon reduction initiatives among UK firms, implying that the adoption of a 
sustainable compensation policy can encourage management to develop and implement carbon 
reduction initiatives; however, it is not effective in reducing GHG emissions. 
Under resource dependence theory, the board of directors can be considered a resource utilised 
in managing the business, including corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related challenges 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Since carbon strategy 
formulation is one of the main contributions of the board as a resource (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), formulating an effective carbon strategy is based on having directors with the requisite 
diverse expertise and a wider stakeholder perspective. Shaukat et al. (2016) report a positive 
link between a board’s CSR orientation, including board gender diversity, independence and 
financial expertise on the audit committee, and the likelihood of developing a proactive and 
comprehensive CSR strategy. Financial experts on audit committees are more likely to be better 
equipped for supporting the board in developing environmental strategies that can help avoid 
and manage CSR-related financial and regulatory risks and that can budget for long-term 
environmental initiatives (e.g., Helfaya & Moussa 2017; Shaukat et al., 2016; Lee & Hutchison 
2005). 
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Moreover, resource dependence theory suggests that, when board members hold multiple 
directorship, it increases the exposure of board members to a broad spectrum of strategic and 
governance issues of other firms related to environmental practices (de Villiers et al., 2011; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For instance, de Villiers et al. (2011) 
report that directors with more directorships enhance inter-organisational linkages and the 
knowledge base about environmental management, which increases managerial ability to adopt 
proactive environmental strategies and hence improve environmental performance. In contrast, 
Haque (2017) reports that multiple directorships have a negative relationship with a firm’s 
carbon reduction initiatives, suggesting that busy directors have limited capacity and time to 
provide useful advice on strategic environmental decisions and to monitor ongoing projects for 
climate protection initiatives. 
Given the above and based on the predictions of both agency and resource dependence theories, 
we hypothesise that more environmentally oriented boards are expected to have a larger impact 
on a firm’s carbon strategies. Thus, the study’s first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1. Board environmental orientation has a direct influence on carbon strategy. 
 
 
2.2. Carbon strategy and carbon performance 
Previous research seems to focus on the relationship between environmental performance and 
firm performance, overlooking the role of having a proactive environmental strategy, although 
it has been reported that firm performance can be enhanced through a sound environmental 
strategy (Clarkson et al., 2011a; Solovida & Latan, 2017). Clarkson et al. (2011a), for example, 
report a positive link between environmental and financial performance, which is influenced 
by a proactive environmental strategy. Under agency theory, effective monitoring of 
management includes ensuring the establishment of proper strategies that can lead to enhanced 
carbon performance. As carbon performance is linked to firm value (Matsumura et al., 2014), 
setting a proactive carbon strategy is an integral part of a successful business strategy. 
From an environmental legitimacy standpoint, in response to community pressures, 
government regulations, and initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, firms are 
encouraged to adopt strategies that enhance environmental performance to support their 
environmental legitimacy (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Moreover, the effectiveness of 
environmental strategies can be enhanced by adopting a legitimacy-based orientation (Hart, 
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1995). Enhancing the firm’s reputation should reflect positively on its performance. Corporate 
legitimation strategies can be either proactive, aiming at establishing and enhancing the firm’s 
social acceptance, or reactive, aiming at repairing the firm’s legitimacy after an environmental 
incident, for instance (Cho, 2009; Menguc, Auh, & Ozanne, 2010; Suchman, 1995). Firms are 
expected to establish proactive carbon strategies geared towards enhancing their carbon 
performance as part of their efforts to enhance their social acceptance. Shaukat et al. (2016), 
for instance, report a positive link between CSR strategy and environmental performance. 
Accordingly, based on the above discussion, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2. Carbon strategy has a direct influence on actual carbon performance. 
 
2.3. Board environmental orientation and carbon performance: Direct and indirect 
effects 
The direct impact of BEO on environmental performance has been addressed in a few studies. 
In accordance with agency theory, de Villiers et al. (2011) report that firms with more 
independent directors on the board have better environmental performance. Similarly, few 
studies report a positive association between corporate social performance and board 
independence (Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011); 
others show a positive link with gender diversity (Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Post et al., 2011; 
Shahab, Ntim, Chengang, Ullah, & Fosu, 2018; Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012; Webb, 2004). 
Moreover, Haque (2017) reports that board independence, board gender diversity and a 
sustainable compensation policy have a positive association with carbon reduction initiatives, 
which are a proxy for carbon performance. On the other hand, multiple directorships and CEO 
duality are reported to have a negative impact on corporate social performance (Mallin & 
Michelon, 2011). 
Drawing upon resource dependence theory, the board of directors can be considered a resource 
utilised in managing the business, including CSR-related challenges (Hillman et al., 2000; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A proper mix of board members with the requisite diverse expertise 
and a wider stakeholder perspective is essential in formulating an effective strategy that leads 
to strong environmental performance (Shaukat et al., 2016). The literature seems to support 
this view, as many studies report evidence of a positive link between board characteristics 
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related to environmental issues and both CSR performance (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Mallin 
& Michelon, 2011; Post et al., 2011; Webb, 2004) and carbon performance (Haque, 2017). 
The above discussion highlights a focus in previous research on the ‘direct’ influence of BEO 
on environmental and carbon performance. However, the discussion leading to developing our 
first two hypotheses above claims that BEO has an impact on carbon strategy, which in turn 
has an impact on carbon performance, suggesting an indirect relationship. Although we are not 
aware of any study examining the indirect impact of BEO on carbon performance, the 
discussion provided in this section leads us to posit that the influence of BEO on carbon 
performance can also be indirect through the strategies set by board. This indirect influence 
reflects whether, or not, the carbon strategies of a firm, which are influenced by its BEO, are 
effective in enhancing its carbon performance (i.e., lower GHG emissions). Building on the 
above, our third and fourth hypotheses are as follows: 
H3. Board environmental orientation directly influences actual carbon performance. 
 
H4. Board environmental orientation indirectly influences actual carbon performance 
      through the mediating role of carbon strategy. 
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the four hypotheses of this study, which are informed by the above 
three theories. These hypotheses examine the links among BEO, carbon strategy (CS), and 
carbon performance. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Sample selection and data sources 
Our sample comprises S&P 500 companies for a period of 11 years (2005-2015). We chose 
the US for this study because it is the world’s second largest carbon emitter after China, and 
climate-change issues are salient (BP, 2018). We selected this period because the development 
of national policies focused on measuring, reporting, and managing GHG emissions received 
greater attention. For example, in 2009, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
introduced a rule mandating the reporting of GHG emissions. 
Following related research (e.g., Haque, 2017; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Shaukat et al., 2016), 
this study collected data on firm-level GHG emissions, carbon strategy, and BEO from 
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Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database, which collects data from several sources (such as 
sustainability reports, company annual reports and the Carbon Disclosure Project). The 
ASSET4 database provides largely objective, relevant and systematic environmental, social 
and governance information, and its quality is scrutinised by experienced analysts. In addition, 
we collected firm-specific characteristics from the Worldscope database. We then excluded 
2,196 firm-year observations due to missing GHG emissions data. We further eliminated 1,058 
firm-year observations due to missing specific governance and financial data, resulting in a 
final sample of 2,301 firm-year observations. Table 1 depicts the industry‐and‐year-wise 
distribution of the sample. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2. Variable measurement 
Board environmental orientation (BEO). We define BEO as the extent to which the board of 
directors recognises a firm’s environmental issues that matter to stakeholders. Prior studies 
propose a number of board characteristics that are linked to better environmental performance, 
including board independence, board gender diversity, financial expertise on audit committees 
(de Villiers et al., 2011; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Shaukat et al., 2016), a sustainability-based 
compensation policy, and multiple directorships (Glass et al., 2016; Haque, 2017; Ji, 2015). To 
measure board orientation towards CSR issues, the works of Shaukat et al. (2016) and Helfaya 
& Moussa (2017) were relied on. Helfaya & Moussa (2017), for example, use a construct of 
three board attributes as an indicator of board CSR orientation: board independence, female 
board representation, and an audit committee’s financial expertise. For the purposes of this 
study, we develop a multi-dimensional construct to measure the latent construct, i.e., BEO, 
consisting of five board characteristics. These characteristics are (i) board independence (i.e., 
% of independent directors), (ii) board gender diversity (i.e., % of female directors on the 
board), (iii) audit committee’s financial expertise (i.e., % of audit committee with financial 
expertise), (iv) sustainability-based compensation policy (i.e., 1 if the firm adopts a 
compensation policy linked to environmental sustainability activities and 0 otherwise), and (v) 
multiple directorships (i.e., the average corporate affiliations of board directors; this is expected 
to have a negative relationship with the carbon performance of the firm) (see, for example, de 
Villiers et al., 2011; Haque, 2017; Liao et al., 2015; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Shaukat et al., 
2016). A higher mean score indicates more sustainable and environmentally conducive board 
attributes. 
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Carbon strategy. Following prior studies (Haque, 2017; Weinhofer & Hoffmann 2010), carbon 
strategy was defined as a set of proactive initiatives and policies to reduce firms’ GHG 
emissions. Using the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database, carbon strategy was measured by 
an unweighted index including eight variables, as shown in Table 2. A higher carbon strategy 
score indicates more carbon reduction initiatives and policies implemented by the firm to 
maintain corporate legitimacy and to positively manage stakeholders’ perceptions. The score 
is stated as a ratio of the total possible score, i.e., 8 (each indicator out of the 8 indicators was 
coded as 0/1). 
Carbon performance. We measured carbon performance using the natural logarithm of total 
GHG emissions (in tons), which reflects a firm’s level of carbon pollution (see, for example, 
Haque, 2017; Luo, Tang, & Lan, 2013). A lower GHG emissions level indicates better carbon 
performance by the firm. 
Control variables. We controlled for other factors that can influence carbon strategy and/or 
carbon performance (see their full definitions in Table 2). We control for firm size since the 
literature shows its significant impact on carbon performance, although the nature of this 
impact seems inconclusive. For example, some authors argue that large firms, which have a 
greater impact on communities and are subject to greater public and media scrutiny, are more 
likely to engage in environmentally friendly activities, including carbon reduction initiatives 
(de Villiers et al., 2011). Moreover, large firms are more likely to cause greater GHG emissions 
unless they invest in environmentally friendly technology, which requires massive capital 
investment (Haque & Ntim, 2018). 
We also controlled for firm profitability since prior studies suggest that profitable firms are 
more likely to have enough resources to be able to be more proactive towards environmental 
concerns (de Villiers et al., 2011). As proposed by related research (Clarkson et al., 2011a; de 
Villiers et al., 2011), we controlled for the effect of firm leverage on carbon performance. 
Haque (2017), for instance, finds that highly leveraged firms show a greater focus on 
environmental engagement to meet stakeholders’ expectations and gain legitimacy. 
Since the related literature finds that firms with higher market-to-book ratios are likely to have 
greater investment opportunities and thus are more willing to pursue sound environmental 
policies and practices that can improve environmental performance (e.g., de Villiers et al., 
2011), the impact of the market-to-book ratio is another variable for which we controlled. 
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Taking into consideration the findings of related research (e.g., Baboukardos, (2017) that loss-
making firms are positively related to GHG emissions, we controlled for the effect of loss. We 
follow de Villiers et al. (2011), among others, in using capital expenditure as a control variable 
since firms with a higher capital expenditure are more likely to use eco-friendly technologies, 
which lead to better carbon performance. 
We also controlled for the impact of other governance variables that might influence carbon 
performance. These variables include block shareholdings (Shaukat et al., 2016), board size 
(Haque, 2017), CEO-chair duality (de Villiers et al., 2011), and industry type and year 
(Petersen, 2009). The available literature, such as Shaukat et al. 2016, finds that block 
shareholders tend to focus mainly on their own interests, which leads to a decline in 
environment-related activism. However, Haque (2017) finds a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and carbon performance, suggesting that block shareholders are likely 
to promote sustainable environmental policies and practices that can enhance long-term 
shareholder value. Given that a firm’s carbon management requires immense long-term 
investment without financial gains in the short term, block shareholders might be unwilling to 
adopt environmentally responsible strategies. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between 
block shareholdings and the level of GHG emissions. 
 [TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.3. Structural equation modelling 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) with maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test 
the research model. SEM has some advantages that make it a powerful statistical technique, in 
our case, compared to multiple regression analysis. First, SEM addresses multi-equation 
regression models and multiple measures of concepts that fit well with our research model. 
Second, SEM allows all the variables to correlate (inter-correlations), and hence, the cause-
effect relationships among variables can be inferred (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012). Finally, SEM 
simultaneously considers both direct and indirect structural effects between latent variables 
(Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012). 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Figure 2 depicts the mean values of actual GHG emissions trends over the 2005-2015 period 
for the full sample and both high and low carbon-intensive industries sub-samples. The level 
of GHG emissions decreased steadily between 2006 and 2012 and increased slightly in 2013 
and 2014 before decreasing again in 2015. This result offers evidence that S&P 500 firms have 
taken a proactive stance to reduce GHG emissions by adopting environmental policies and 
strategies as well as investing in environmentally friendly technologies. This approach helps 
firms to demonstrate their response to governmental regulations and thus gain legitimacy as 
well as maintain their survival and growth. Figure 2 also shows that the average GHG 
emissions are significantly higher in high carbon-intensive industries than in low carbon-
intensive industries (11.89 and 4.92 million metric tons, respectively), which is consistent with 
the findings of Haque (2017) and Luo & Tang (2014). 
 [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In addition, Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the study variables. The average firm 
in the sample emits 8.4 million tons of GHG emissions, with a minimum of 0.001 and a 
maximum of 166 million tons per year. The carbon strategy score ranges from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 100%, with an average of 44.4%. There is an increasing trend in carbon 
strategy from 2007 onwards, which can be explained by the argument that US firms still decide 
voluntarily to adopt environmental strategies and policies. Consequently, there is a real need 
for a set of rules and regulations to encourage high carbon-intensive firms to take more 
proactive actions towards reducing their GHG emissions as a contribution to a better society. 
Moreover, the mean firm size, which is measured by total assets, is $ 82.50 billion, with a 
minimum of $ 1.30 billion and a maximum of $ 2573.10 billion. The mean leverage is 26.10%, 
suggesting that S&P firms depend narrowly on external financing (i.e., they are lowly 
leveraged). The mean value of profitability in our sample is 9.82%. The mean of block 
shareholdings is almost 11.78%, with a range of 0% to approximately 81%, suggesting that 
shares held by block shareholdings vary significantly among the sampled firms. In addition, 
the mean values for other control variables are capital expenditure 4.62%, market-to-book 
value 4.13%, and loss‐making companies (Loss) 0.06%, suggesting that a few firms reported 
negative earnings per share during the sample period. Finally, eleven directors, on average, 
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serve on the boards, with a minimum of five and a maximum of twenty, which is comparable 
with the findings of Liao et al. (2015). 
Table 3 also displays the Pearson’s correlations for all the dependent, independent and control 
variables. Given that the correlations among all the independent variables are relatively low, 
multicollinearity is less likely to be a problem for our analyses (Gujarati, 2009). 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2. Measurement model estimation and fit 
Table 4 shows the results of the measurement model for both carbon strategy and BEO. 
Regarding carbon strategy, it was found that all the indicators were highly significant at the 
alpha level of 0.001. As shown in Table 4, the carbon strategy construct is satisfactory (GFI, 
AGFI, CFI and NFI > 0.90 and RMSEA < 0.07), suggesting that the hypothesised measurement 
model fits the data well. Furthermore, the results of the five BEO indicators of our measurement 
model are highly significant at the alpha level of 0.001 with the correct direction, except one 
indicator, i.e., audit committee financial expertise (BEO3 in Table 4), which was excluded 
from further analysis. Therefore, only four items represent BEO in the final analysis. For all 
the indicators of BEO, the standardised weights are highly significant and positive. The overall 
goodness fit indices of our measurement model (GFI, AGFI, CFI and NFI > 0.9 and RMSEA 
< .07) show a very good fit, and their indicators are within the desirable and acceptable range. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.3. Structural model results and hypothesis testing 
Table 5 presents the results of the structural model to investigate the research hypotheses. The 
goodness of fit indices, as shown in Table 5, are well above the recommended values, 
suggesting that the structural model fits the data well (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012). Using Baron & 
Kenny’s (1986) technique in testing for mediation, the relationships among the three main 
variables must be tested and satisfy the following four conditions: (1) the independent variable 
(BEO) significantly influences the dependent variable (carbon performance); (2) the 
independent variable significantly influences the carbon strategy (mediator); (3) the mediator 
variable significantly influences the dependent variable; and (4) the impact of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable must be reduced or must become statistically insignificant 
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after controlling for the effect of the mediator. If the first three conditions are significant and 
the relationship between BEO and carbon performance is still significant but reduced, this is 
called "partially" mediated, but if the relationship between BEO and carbon performance is not 
significant, the effect of the carbon strategy is called "fully" mediated. 
The results of the structural model show that BEO is positively related to carbon strategy (β= 
0.201, p-value <0.001), suggesting that a greater environmental orientation by the board has a 
greater influence on carbon strategy and hence supports H1. We also find that carbon strategy 
is negatively related to actual GHG emissions, as a proxy for carbon performance (β= -0.253, 
p-value<0.001), implying that H2 is empirically supported. Furthermore, the results reveal a 
negative and statistically significant effect of BEO on actual GHG emissions (β=-0.136, p < 
0.001). This negative direct relationship lends support to H3. 
Regarding the mediating effects of carbon strategy on the association between BEO and firm 
performance related to GHG emissions, the indirect results show a significant indirect effect 
(β= -0.104, p-value <0.10). This finding, along with the fact that the direct effect between BEO 
and actual GHG emissions performance is still significant but decreased, as in the basic model, 
suggests that BEO directly and indirectly affects a firm’s carbon performance via the carbon 
strategy. The mediation model (with carbon strategy) also explains more variation in carbon 
performance than the basic model, namely, 61.2% vs 55.8%, respectively. These results offer 
empirical support for H4, suggesting that the relationship between BEO and firm carbon 
performance is partially mediated by carbon strategy. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.4. Additional analysis: High versus low carbon-intensive industries  
Although we control for industry effects, the discovered association among the study variables 
can still vary between industries based on their sensitivity to carbon pollution. Previous studies 
(e.g., Baboukardos, 2017; Haque, 2017; Jaggi, Allini, Macchioni, & Zagaria, 2018) show a 
positive relationship between high GHG emissions and specific energy-intensive industries, 
such as manufacturing, mining, chemicals and basic materials. This study follows, among 
others, Jaggi et al. (2018) in classifying the whole sample into two categories: high carbon-
intensive industries and low carbon-intensive industries. High carbon-intensive industries (N 
= 1246) include firms belonging to the oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods 
and utilities sectors, whereas low carbon-intensive industries (N = 1055) include firms 
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belonging to the health care, consumer services, financial, telecommunications and technology 
industries. We then re-run our models by splitting the full sample into two sub-samples. 
The results, as shown in Table 6, show a different image of the role of carbon strategy in high 
versus low carbon-intensive industries. More specifically, in low carbon-intensive industries, 
the results (Table 6 - Model 1) document a significant positive relationship between BEO and 
carbon strategy (β= 0.304, p-value<0.001) and a significant negative relationship between 
carbon strategy and GHG emissions as a proxy for carbon performance (β= -0.019, p-
value<0.001). More importantly, the full mediation effect of carbon strategy is also evident for 
low carbon-emissions industries (β= -0.096, ns). These results suggest that, in low carbon-
intensive industries, the higher the BEO is, the more proactive and comprehensive the firm’s 
carbon strategy, and the better its carbon performance in terms of lower GHG emissions. This 
evidence suggests that a firm’s carbon strategy is a mechanism through which BEO influences 
its carbon performance. 
Regarding high carbon-intensive industries, we find that the direct effect of BEO on carbon 
strategy (β= 0.446, p-value<0.001) is significant. Additionally, the results show a significant 
and negative direct effect of carbon strategy on actual GHG emissions (β= -0.133, p-
value<0.001) as well as a significant effect of carbon strategy on the BEO- GHG emissions 
relationship (β= -0.082, p-value<0.05). These results show that a firm’s carbon strategy 
partially mediates the relationship between BEO and actual carbon performance. 
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.5 Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of analyses to ascertain the results’ robustness. First, to investigate 
whether the findings are sensitive to the winsorisation operation (see Haque, 2017; Luo, Lan, 
& Tang, 2012), we re-run our models by winsorizing all the data at the 1% and 99% levels, 
and the results (not shown) are similar to those shown in Table 5. Second, we use an alternative 
measure for actual GHG emissions, which is the carbon intensity. The carbon intensity is 
measured by the ratio of total GHG emissions to total assets (see Luo & Tang, 2014). The 
results using this alternative measure (not reported) confirm our previous findings contained in 
Table 5. Third, we also use market capitalisation as an alternative measure of firm size (e.g., 
Haque, 2017), and the results (not reported) remained unchanged, suggesting that our evidence 
is rigorous. Fourth, we re-run our models by replacing carbon strategy with the CSR strategy 
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score, which is available on the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. This index captures firm-
level CSR policies and initiatives, with higher scores demonstrating higher firm commitment 
to CSR activities and more comprehensive and proactive CSR strategies (e.g., Helfaya & 
Moussa, 2017; Shaukat et al., 2016). The results (not shown) are essentially similar to those 
presented in Table 5. Finally, to additionally address potential simultaneity concerns, we re-
run our results by including a one-year lag of the independent and control variables to allow 
time for the impact of BEO and carbon strategy to show up in the corporate carbon performance 
(see, for example, Post et al. 2015). Our results remain qualitatively the same as those reported 
in Table 5. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
Our results support the hypothesised relationship between BEO and carbon strategy (H1), 
which is in line with the predictions of our multi-theoretical framework that integrates insights 
from agency, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. One theoretical implication of this 
finding is that boards with a greater environmental orientation are not only able to be involved 
in greater managerial monitoring to encourage management to develop and implement carbon 
reduction initiatives (agency theory) but also can help to signal their congruence with national 
environmental initiatives and policies (legitimacy theory) and facilitate access to critical 
resources (resource dependence theory). Additionally, this result is consistent with that of prior 
research (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011a; Haque, 2017; Glass et al. 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016), 
which suggests that firms with greater environmentally oriented boards (i.e., independent 
directors with the requisite diverse expertise and a wider stakeholder perspective) tend to adopt 
carbon reduction strategies. One possible explanation for this result is the board’s desire to 
develop a positive corporate image due to their environmental responsibility to legitimise their 
existence and manage stakeholders’ perceptions. 
Our results also reveal that carbon strategy has a negative relationship with actual GHG 
emissions (H2). This finding is consistent with the view that a carbon strategy is a key part of 
a successful business strategy, which in turn improves corporate environmental performance 
(e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011b; Hart, 1995). This evidence is consistent with the predictions of 
legitimacy theory in that carbon reduction strategies can mitigate climate-related risks and 
improve firms’ public image and reputation actions, which in turn enhances their 
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environmental performance. This result is consistent with those reported in previous studies 
(e.g., Journeault, 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016; Solovida & Latan, 2017), which concluded that 
carbon reduction initiatives (as part of an environmental strategy) have a positive effect on 
environmental performance. 
Our study shows a negative relationship between BEO and actual GHG emissions (H3). This 
finding is broadly in line with resource dependence theory in that firms with 
more environmentally oriented boards can attract human and relational capital resources and 
thus make positive contributions to society through enhancing firms’ long-term sustainability 
performance. Furthermore, agency theory suggests that the effective monitoring of 
management, which includes the adoption and implantation of carbon strategies, can enhance 
firms’ carbon performance. This result also offers empirical support for the findings of de 
Villiers et al. (2011), Dixon-Fowler et al. (2017), Shahab et al. (2018), and Shaukat et al. 
(2016), suggesting that, as board orientation towards environmental accountability increases, 
environmental performance appears to improve, which manifests as reduced GHG emissions. 
The study results show that carbon strategy partially mediates the relationship between BEO 
and carbon performance (H4). This result suggests one pathway (i.e., carbon strategy) through 
which boards of directors may indirectly influence a firm’s environmental performance in 
terms of lower GHG emissions. This result offers empirical support for the findings of related 
research (e.g., de Villiers et al., 2011; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Post et al., 2015; Shaukat et 
al., 2016), suggesting that boards with directors who are independent, have diverse expertise 
and are of diverse gender backgrounds tend to adopt environmentally responsible activities that 
in turn can lead to sound environmental performance. 
Interestingly, splitting our sample into high and low carbon-intensive industries to further 
examine the role of carbon strategy shows mediation (effects of carbon strategy in both 
industries). This finding provides support for the suggestion by Solovida & Latans (2017) that 
the board can promote strategic carbon initiatives as a pathway to strengthen corporate 
environmental performance. This result also provides empirical support for legitimacy theory, 
which suggests that firms in high carbon-intensive industries are likely to adopt carbon-
emissions strategies and initiatives to gain and maintain corporate legitimacy and avoid public 
accountability. However, the mediation effects vary in both industries since our results show 
partial mediation in high carbon-intensive industries and full mediation in low carbon-
emissions industries. A possible explanation of the partial mediation in high carbon-sensitive 
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industries may be due to the role of other factors, such as pressure generated from stakeholders, 
regulations and/or best practices, in encouraging firms to strengthen their carbon performance. 
 
6 CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The study examines the mediating effect that a firm’s carbon strategy has on the relationship 
between its board environmental orientation (BEO) and carbon performance. The investigation 
is based on data from all S&P 500 firms for the 2005-2015 period. The results provide evidence 
that a firm’s carbon strategy is a mechanism through which the BEO influences its actual 
carbon performance. A firm’s BEO and carbon strategy are important factors in reducing its 
GHG emissions. Having a board of directors with the proper mix of skills, knowledge and 
experience leads to developing a proactive carbon strategy, which in turn leads to enhanced 
carbon performance. These results lend support to agency, resource dependence and legitimacy 
theories. 
On a practical note, this study has a number of implications for managers and policy makers. 
First, in line with the recommendations of previous studies, it is crucial to enhance firms’ BEO 
through board design to bring diversified monitoring skills and access to resources. 
Specifically, firms’ BEO can be enhanced by having more independent directors, a lower 
presence of busy directors, and greater representation by female directors. Our findings give 
more support to calls to increase female representation in the corporate boardroom by 
introducing gender quotas such as those in the Iceland, Norway and France (Deloitte, 2017). 
Second, our findings highlight one mechanism (i.e., carbon strategy) that might explain how 
corporate boards affect environmental performance in both high and low carbon-incentive 
industries. Therefore, it is vital for managers to promote strategic carbon-reduction initiatives, 
which in turn could improve environmental performance and send a positive signal to 
stakeholders, such as environmental activists, that their firms are seriously concerned about the 
environment. This evidence also has practical implications for socially responsible investors 
who believe that more attention should be paid to firms engaging in environmental 
sustainability initiatives. 
Third, as investors are becoming more interested in investing in environmentally friendly firms, 
our results deliver a clear message to investors about the important role of a proactive carbon 
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strategy as a mechanism that the board can use to improve carbon performance and potentially 
increase profitability. Hence, the proactiveness of a firm’s carbon strategy should be considered 
by investors when making investment decisions. 
Fourth, the results provide further evidence for policy makers of the link between corporate 
BEO and environmental performance in general and carbon performance in particular. When 
developing new regulations, not only should policy makers consider the inclusion of board 
members with a greater potential for environmentally friendly perspectives but also should 
consider the role of carbon strategy. Issuing sets of guidelines and rules for firms to develop 
proactive carbon strategies with relevant emissions reduction targets can lead to enhancing 
firms’ carbon performance and create more environmentally responsible business practices. 
More initiatives, such as the US’ mandatory Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative are called for, 
as they have been successful in reducing GHG emissions in the US. 
The development of sets of guidelines and rules for firms to develop proactive carbon strategies 
will lead to a “win-win” strategy instead of the narrow thinking of the traditional “zero-sum 
game” for climate solutions. Firms win because they can develop clearer visions and relevant 
strategic objectives to tackle climate change as well as be recognised for their environmental 
leadership. Investors win because they can allocate their resources with an awareness of 
carbon-related impacts, and the planet wins because a carbon strategy can encourage green 
technologies and energy efficiency and can promote eco-friendly business practices. 
Our findings also shed light on one of the mechanisms (i.e., carbon strategy) through which 
board characteristics may affect corporate carbon performance. Future research can build upon 
this relationship by examining other aspects of firm performance in addition to environmental 
outcomes. Moreover, the partial mediation of carbon strategy suggests that there may be other 
strategic initiatives that boards of directors endorse to improve corporate environmental 
performance. Hence, researchers may investigate other mechanisms, such as environmental 
alliances, to explain the board attributes-performance relationship. 
Nonetheless, our results are subject to some limitations. The scope of our study is limited to all 
S&P 500 US firms; future research can extend this study by replicating it in other economic 
areas, such as China, Australia, or the EU. Another limitation is related to the measurement of 
BEO, which can be criticised for including/excluding certain board attributes from our 
measure. Additionally, the measurement of board independence does not necessarily reflect 
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the real level of directors’ independence when carrying out their responsibilities (de Villiers et 
al., 2011). A similar argument can be made for the measurement of audit committee financial 
expertise. Hence, future research can consider the inclusion of other factors that are not 
included in the current measure of BEO. 
Moreover, since carbon emissions reporting was mainly voluntary in the US until 2009 and 
then became mandatory, good environmental performers may have reported their good carbon 
performance, while firms with poor environmental performance masked or did not report their 
less favourable results (higher levels of GHG emissions). This fact partially raises the issue of 
a self-reporting bias in the sample because carbon emissions and strategies data may be 
available only from those companies that voluntarily reported this information. Further 
research might investigate carbon emissions and strategies under mandatory reporting 
environments. 
Finally, our examination focused on firm GHG emissions and did not consider the supply 
chain. For example, firms may outsource their most polluting operations to other entities, and 
accordingly, these are not included in the emissions figures examined in our study. This issue 
can be addressed in future research. 
To conclude, our study shows that a firm’s BEO and carbon strategy are important factors in 
reducing its GHG emissions. Having a board of directors with the proper mix of skills, 
knowledge and experience leads to developing a proactive carbon strategy, which in turn leads 
to enhanced carbon performance. These results lend support to agency, resource dependence, 
and legitimacy theories. The findings also have some important limitations and raise additional 
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Table 1: Distribution of sample companies across years and industries 
 
Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Percent 
Oil and gas 8 7 9 13 18 15 19 23 20 21 19 172 7.5 
Basic materials 7 8 8 9 15 15 17 19 17 15 12 142 6.1 
Industrials 14 17 25 27 37 39 43 44 37 36 37 356 15.5 
Consumer goods 11 12 15 28 34 39 41 41 39 36 35 331 14.4 
Health care 10 11 11 13 20 21 25 24 21 22 20 198 8.6 
Consumer services 4 6 10 17 28 32 32 33 31 28 30 251 10.9 
Telecommunications 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 23 1.0 
Utilities 8 17 15 22 26 28 27 28 26 25 23 245 10.6 
Financials 8 14 13 17 34 38 44 47 37 36 33 321 14 
Technology 9 10 14 19 28 31 36 33 30 28 24 262 11.4 





Table 2: Variable definition and measurement 
Variable  Measurement 
Carbon performance  Natural log of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in tones 
Carbon strategy  A set of policies and initiatives to manage the effects of firms’ activities on climate 
change that is related to whether the firms did any of the following (each item was 
coded as 0/1): 
− participate in any emissions trading initiative (CS1) 
− reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, phase out or compensate for CO2 
equivalents in the production process? (CS2) 
− evaluate the commercial risks and/or opportunities related to climate change 
(CS3)  
− recycle, reduce, reuse or phase out fluorinated gases such as HFCs 
(hydrofluorocarbons), PFCs (perfluorocarbons) or SF6 (sulphur hexafluoride) 
(CS4)   
− recycle, reduce, reuse or replace ozone-depleting (CFC-11 equivalents, 
chlorofluorocarbon) substances (CS5) 
− make use of renewable energy (CS6) 
− improve their energy efficiency (CS7) 




A composite measure consisting of five elements regarding board attitudes 
towards the environment and climate change: board independence (BEO1), board 
gender diversity (BEO2), financial expertise on audit committee (BEO3), 
sustainability-based compensation policy (BEO4), and multiple directorships 
(BEO5).  
  
Firm size  Natural log of total assets.  
Leverage  Percentage of total debt to total assets.  
Profitability Return on Assets 
Capital expenditure  Percentage of firm capital expenditure to total assets. 
 
Market-to-book ratio The ratio of market to book value of equity. 
 
Loss A dummy variable that equals 1 if EPS is negative and 0 otherwise.  
Block shareholdings Percentage of strategic shareholdings (when 5% or more) that are not available to 
ordinary investors. 
Board size  
 
Natural log of the number of directors serving on the board. 
CEO-chair duality A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chief executive officer (CEO) is serving as 
board chair and 0 otherwise. 
 
Industry Dummies, representing ten industries, based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark. 
  





Table 3: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation matrix for all variables   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Mean 8.40 44.40 64.10 82.50 26.10 9.82 4.62 4.13 0.06 11.78 11.47 0.78 
Std. Dev. 21.50 22.14 11.88 257.40 15.02 9.41 4.15 28.23 0.24 11.04 2.03 0.41 
Min. 0.00 0.00 25.60 1.30 0.00 -148.37 0.00 -232.79 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
Max. 166 100 89.50 2573.10 83.87 53.71 36.60 905.18 1.00 81.00 20.00 1.00 
1. GHG emissions (in million 
metric tons) 
 1           
 
2. Carbon strategy (%) -0.40***  1           
3. Board environmental 
orientation (%) 
-0.28***  0.19***  1         
 
4. Firm size ($billion)  0.30***  0.21***  0.12***  1         
5. Leverage (%)  0.23***  0.07***  0.05*** -0.06***  1        
6. Profitability (%) -0.09***  0.05** -0.03 -0.24*** -0.15***  1       
7. Capital expenditure (%) -0.47***  0.08***  0.15*** -0.10***  0.10*** -0.07***  1      
8. Market-to-book ratio -0.03  0.01  0.01 -0.04  0.03  0.08*** -0.02  1     
9. Loss  0.03 -0.02 -0.05**  0.02  0.08*** -0.43***  0.09*** -0.01  1    
10. Block shareholdings (%)  0.09*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.25***  0.11*** -0.02 -0.02  0.01  0.06***  1   
11. Board size  0.20***  0.16***  0.06***  0.39***  0.03 -0.07*** -0.06***  0.01 -0.03 -0.01 1  
12. CEO-chair duality  0.07***  0.02  0.01  0.06***  0.01 -0.01  0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.07*** 1 
Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, and *** significant at the 0.001 level. All variables with full definitions are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 4:  Construct indicators and measurement model of carbon strategy and BEO  
 
Constructs and Items Standardised 
weights  




Carbon strategy (CS) CS1 0.432*** GFI 0.997 >0.90 
 CS2 0.288*** AGFI 0.990 >0.90 
 CS3 0.383*** CFI 0.989 >0.90 
 CS4 0.456*** NFI 0.982 >0.90 
 CS5 0.329*** RMSEA 0.026 <0.07 
 CS6 0.242***    
 CS7 0.346***    
 CS8 0.615***    
Board environmental orientation 
(BEO) 
BEO1 0.346*** GFI 1.00 >0.90 
 BEO2 0.237*** AGFI 1.00 >0.90 
 BEO3 0.019 CFI 1.00 >0.90 
 BEO4 0.290*** NFI 0.997 >0.90 
 BEO5 0.392*** RMSEA 0.000 <0.07 
 

































Table 5: Results of structural equation models 
 






H1 Board environmental orientation → Carbon strategy   0.201*** 
H2 Carbon strategy→ GHG emissions  -0.253** 
H3 Board environmental orientation → GHG emissions -0.136***  
H4 Board environmental orientation → Carbon strategy→ GHG 
emissions 
 -0.104* 
 Control variables   
 Firm size   0.349***  0.316*** 
 Leverage   0.176***  0.162*** 
 Profitability -0.016 -0.030* 
 Capital expenditure  -0.365*** -0.346*** 
 Market-to-book ratio -0.016  -0.015  
 Loss   0.010  0.022 
 Block shareholdings   0.022  0.035** 
 Board size   0.065***  0.032**  
 CEO-chair duality  0.026*  0.029* 
 Year dummies -0.117*** -0.178*** 
 Industry dummies -0.348*** -0.334*** 
    
 R2 55.8 61.2 
 Goodness-of-fit indices   
 GFI 0.999 0.998 
 AGFI 0.992 0.992 
 CFI 0.999 0.999 
 NFI 0.996 0.995 
 RMSEA 0.015 0.011 
Notes: - * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, and *** significant at 0.001 level. 
-  Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI); Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI); Comparative Fit Index (CFI); Normed 
Fit Index (NFI); Root Mean Square Residual (RMSEA).
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Table 6: Additional analysis: High versus low carbon-intensive industries  











Board environmental orientation → Carbon strategy  0.304***  0.446*** -0.1849* 
Carbon strategy→ GHG emissions -0.019*** -0.037***  1.336 
Board environmental orientation → GHG emissions -0.102*** -0.133*** 1.098 
Board environmental orientation → Carbon strategy→ 
GHG emissions -0.096 -0.082** -1.592* 
Control variables    
Firm size    0.494***  1.149*** -9.476*** 
Leverage    0.005***  0.011*** -2.719*** 
Profitability  -0.051 -0.026 -0.395 
Capital expenditure  -0.113*** -0.063*** -6.377*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 
Loss   0.019   0.013  0.641 
Block shareholdings   0.006***  0.002***  2.358** 
Board size   0.206  0.199  0.019 
CEO-chair duality   0.016  0.105** -1.759* 
Year dummies -0.043*** -0.078***  2.822*** 
Industry dummies -0.105*** -0.136*** -8.967*** 
    
R2 48.5 51.3  
Goodness-of-fit indices    
GFI 0.990 0.994  
AGFI 0.981 0.984  
CFI 0.982 0.986  
NFI 0.972 0.979  
RMSEA 0.027 0.029  
Note: - * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, and *** significant at 0.001 level.  
-  Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI); Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI); Comparative Fit Index (CFI); Normed 
Fit Index (NFI); Root Mean Square Residual (RMSEA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
